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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article describes why nations in Africa should trade their
agricultural products for infrastructure investments. Between 1980
and 2010, the African continent has seen its share of global trade
dwindle from 5.9% to 3.2%,1 while foreign direct investment (FDI)
converges on countries rich in primary commodities such as minerals
and hydrocarbons.2 In fact, investment flowing to Africa tails off if
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Cert. (Univ. Montréal); LL.B. (Univ. Namibia); B.Juris (Univ. Namibia). I presented
this research at the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Biennial
Conference: International Economic Law in Unsettling Times, at the American
University Washington College of Law on July 4th, 2018. I thank the participants
for their questions. If the Article contains any mistakes, inaccuracies or
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1. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., UNCTAD HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS, at
10, UN Sales No. B.11.II.D.1 (2011).
2. See James Thuo Gathii, Beyond China’s Human Rights Exceptionalism in
Africa: Leveraging Science, Technology and Engineering, 51 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 664, 666 (2013) (observing that China largely invests in natural
resources in Africa, activities that are “overwhelmingly correlated with hindering,
rather than promoting economic growth”); see also Alec R. Johnson, Rethinking
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capital inflows to extractive sectors are left out of the equation.3
Investment in other crucial sectors of the economy, notably
infrastructure, has not fared better.4 Even though it is indispensable to
economic growth, investment in infrastructure development has not
kept pace with the development needs of African nations.5
Since the early 2000s, a number of African nations have managed
to increase FDI by exchanging their natural resources for
infrastructure finance.6 The capital attracted in this way amounts to
billions of United States (U.S.) dollars, still it does not meet those
countries’ enormous needs. Today, Africa’s infrastructure financing
gap adds up to no less than 130 billion U.S. dollars a year.7Moreover,
resources-for-infrastructure (R4I) exchanges typically involve
minerals or oil, which are non-renewable resources.8
Although agricultural products are responsible for the employment
and livelihoods of many more people than the exports of other primary
commodities, they have not yet become the main focus of foreign
capital in Africa.9 Additionally, in the international trading system,
Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa, 59 EMORY L.J. 919, 920
(2010).
3. Johnson, supra note 2, at 920.
4. See Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A
Critique, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 131, 137 (2013) (noting that despite the fact that
foreign investment from developing countries to the least developed countries has
increased, only a very small percentage of those investments goes to non-traditional
sectors, such as manufacturing and tourism).
5. U.N. HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, THE GLOBAL URBAN ECONOMIC
DIALOGUE SERIES: INFRASTRUCTURE FOR ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY
REDUCTION INAFRICA, at 50, UN Doc. HS/192/10E (2011).
6. See Dunia Prince Zongwe, How Africans Trade Their Riches for Roads and
Bridges: Three Stories, in NEW AFRICAN THINKERS AGENDA 2063: CULTURE AT
THEHEARTOF SUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT 36, 43, 52 (Olga Bialostocka ed., 2018)
[hereinafter Zongwe, Three Stories]; see also HÅVARDHALLAND ET AL., RESOURCE
FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE: A DISCUSSION ON A NEW FORM OF INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCING 5 (2014); VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., BUILDING BRIDGES: CHINA’S
GROWING ROLE AS INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCIER FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 55
(2009).
7. See Barclay Ballard, Bridging Africa’s Infrastructure Gap, WORLD FIN.
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.worldfinance.com/infrastructure-investment/project-
finance/bridging-africas-infrastructure-gap.
8. See HALLAND ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
9. Pascal Liu, Impacts of Foreign Agricultural Investment on Developing
Countries: Evidence from Case Studies 2-3 (FAO Commodity and Trade Policy
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agricultural subsidies from European and North American states have
flooded global food markets with their own agricultural exports,
thereby ravaging agriculture in the developing world.10
As Asian giants like China and India rise, however, demand for
agricultural products from Africa is likely to grow exponentially.11
While African nations can engage in agricultural trade with Asia
through traditional exports, nothing prevents African states from
channeling parts of that demand towards infrastructure development.
Such a channeling of demand for agricultural products occurred in
2007 when a Chinese state-owned firm started to build the Bui Dam
in Ghana.12
This Article scrutinizes how Ghanaian and Chinese parties financed
the Bui Dam through the export of cocoa and proposes this
arrangement as a model for building up both infrastructure
investments and agricultural exports in Africa. It further argues that
the Bui Dam represents the superior form of international investment
contract, not least because—unlike minerals and hydrocarbons—
agricultural products are renewable and labor-intensive. At a time
when the mainstream international investment regime suffers from a
crisis of legitimacy,13 developing nations must actively search for
Research Working Paper No. 47, 2014).
10. SeeYASHTANDON, TRADE ISWAR: THEWEST’SWARAGAINST THEWORLD
38-39 (2015) (stating that EU and US trade-distorting subsidies continue to cause a
global problem for the agricultural system by “flood[ing] global markets with below-
cost commodities, depressing prices, and undercutting producers in poor countries”).
11. Jack Perkowski,China’s Growing Food Problem/Opportunity, FORBESASIA
(Sept. 25, 2014, 9:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2014/
09/25/chinas-growing-food-problemopportunity/#6b0aeccb4811.
12. Dunia Prince Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure: A Contractual Model for the
Optimization of China’s Investments in the Mining Sectors of Africa 307 (Aug.
2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure].
13. SeeMakane Moïse Mbengue & Stefanie Schacherer, The ‘Africanization’ of
International Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the Reform of
the International Investment Regime, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 414, 434 (2017)
(observing that most international investment agreements stipulate reciprocal
obligations on contracting states but do not impose any direct legal obligations on
foreign investors under international law regarding the way they conduct business);
see also Romulo Brillo, Living Without Investment Treaties: The Brazilian
Approach to Investment Policy Making and Dispute Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICLAWANDAFRICANDEVELOPMENT 172, 172 (Laurence Boulle et al. eds.,
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alternative models or scenarios. And, at a time when trade volumes
and capital inflows are shrinking,14 developing nations can ill-afford
to ignore the possibilities offered by the Bui Dam scenario.
II. ARGUMENT FOR THE MAIN PROPOSITION
My main argument follows this truism of international economics:
subject to certain conditions,15 a country will sell what it has in
abundance to another country in exchange for what it has in shortage.16
China has substantial infrastructure capacity but has a shortage of
food.17 Therefore, following the principle articulated above, China
will “sell” its infrastructure capacity to another country in exchange
for food.
Similarly, a country will buy what it has a shortage of from another
country in exchange for what it has in abundance.18 Africa has vast
agricultural potential but has a shortage of infrastructure capacity.19
Therefore, Africa will likely “buy” infrastructure capacity from
another country in exchange for agricultural products.
To support these propositions, I have divided the rest of this Article
into five parts. The first part explains the Bui Dam scenario. The
second part provides background on this type of investment or trade
transaction. In that section, I spell out what makes the Bui Dam model
stand apart from other contracts and from traditional investment
contracts. Then, I will discuss the weaknesses of the Bui Dam model.
Finally, I will draw out policy implications flowing from the Bui Dam
scenario.
2014); Ofodile, supra note 4, at 136.
14. See Laurence Boulle et al., International Economic Law and African
Development – An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW ANDAFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT 1, 3-4 (Laurence Boulle et al. eds., 2014).
15. See, e.g., HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT
CAPITALISM 125-29 (2011) (showing how South Korea prospered by largely
ignoring what the theory of comparative advantage prescribed in terms of industrial
policies).
16. See Michele Ruta, Resources Trade and the WTO, VOX CEPR POL’Y
PORTAL (Aug. 4, 2010), https://voxeu.org/article/trade-natural-resources-and-wto.
17. Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 139.
18. See Ruta, supra note 16.
19. Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 175.
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III. THE BUI DAM SCENARIO
One of the greatest strengths of the Bui Dam scenario is that it
reduces prohibitively high search costs.20 Indeed, the Bui Dam project
illustrates well the high costs of financing infrastructure for most
resource-rich countries in Africa because of the credit risk, payment
insecurity, and low creditworthiness faced by those countries.21 Most
experts overlook the benefits of reducing search costs when evaluating
the Bui Dam, R4I contracts, and the massive capital inflows to the
continent.22
The British-Australian geologist Albert E. Kitson first conceived
the idea to build the Bui Dam in 1925.23With support from the World
Bank and Australia, planning for the Dam began in 1960, three years
after Ghana gained independence from the United Kingdom.24 After
this, many studies considered how a hydropower scheme could be
developed on the Black Volta River at the Bui Gorge, from the J.S.
Zhuk Hydroprojeckt by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R.) in 1966 to the feasibility study by the French Coyne et
Bellier (now Tractebel Engineering) in 1995.25 In October 2006, the
latter updated their feasibility study, which enabled the Ghanaian
government and the Chinese state-owned firm Sinohydro to
commence the project.26 Then, in July 2007, the Ghanaian President
promulgated the Bui Power Authority Act.27 The Act established the
Bui Power Authority (BPA)28 with the mandate to develop a
“hydroelectric power project on the Black Volta River at Bui and any
other potential power sites on the Black Volta River.”29
Since Ghana achieved independence in 1957, successive
20. Id. at 351.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Bui Dam Electricity Project, Ghana, WATER TECH., https://www.water-
technology.net/projects/bui-dam-hydro-power-ghana/ (last accessed Dec. 12, 2018).
24. Id.
25. Project Background, BUI POWER AUTH., https://www.buipower.com/
node/139 (last visited Dec. 11, 2018).
26. Id.
27. See generally Act 740, Bui Power Authority Act, 2007 (Ghana).
28. Id. § 1.
29. Id. at pmbl.
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governments unsuccessfully attempted to find foreign investors to
fund and build the Bui Dam.30 It was only in 2007 when the
government of John Kufuor signed its first reported R4I deal with
China that Ghana succeeded in raising the necessary funds to build the
much-needed and long-awaited Bui hydroelectric complex.31
Sinohydro started work in 2007 and completed the Bui Dam in
December 2013.32
The Bui Dam is located in north-western Ghana within Bui National
Park, an environmentally protected area.33 Despite its location in a
protected area, the Bui Dam project was still seen as the most
technically and economically appealing hydropower site in the
country after the Akosombo and Kpong hydro power plants.34
The Dam generates 400 megawatts of power.35 It mostly provides
energy to the three northern regions of Ghana.36 Although Ghana
primarily designed it to generate hydropower, the project also features
an irrigation scheme for developing agriculture, thereby presenting an
opportunity to enhance ecotourism and fisheries.37 The Dam also
facilitates the irrigation of about 30,000 hectares of land.38 The Bui
Power Authority owns the Dam.39 Its functions are to plan, execute,
and manage the Bui hydroelectric project.40
At first sight, the financing of the Bui Dam project looks ordinary.
The Export-Import Bank of China (“China Exim Bank”) financed
most of the project by a hybrid credit facility comprising a
concessional loan of 263.5 million U.S. dollars and a buyer’s credit of
298.5 million U.S. dollars.41 All in all, China Exim Bank contributed
30. Zongwe, Three Stories, supra note 6, at 52-53.
31. Id. at 53.
32. See Bui Dam Electricity Project, Ghana, supra note 23.
33. Bui Hydroelectric Power Dam Project in Ghana, EJOLT (July 20, 2015),
http://www.ejolt.org/2015/07/bui-hydroelectric-power-dam-project-ghana/.
34. Project Background, supra note 25.
35. Id.
36. Benefits of the Bui Project, BUI POWER AUTH., https://www.buipower.com/
node/133 (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).
37. Project Background, supra note 25.
38. Bui Dam Electricity Project, Ghana, supra note 23.
39. Id.
40. Act 740, Bui Power Authority Act, § 11(1) 2007 (Ghana).
41. Finance Plan, BUI POWER AUTH., https://www.buipower.com/node/135
2019] AFRICA CANDRUMUP LARGE INFRASTRUCTUREDEALS 643
562 million U.S. dollars to the project’s total cost of 790 million U.S.
dollars.42 The Bank offered the loans with a grace period of five years
and a repayment period of twenty years.43 So far, nothing unusual.
The agreement becomes unusual once the provisions regarding how
Ghana would reimburse the loans are examined. By the terms of its
agreement with China Exim Bank, Ghana had to repay the loans with
about 30,000 tons of cocoa.44 Paying with agricultural products
constitutes an unusual development in international economic
relations.45 On deeper analysis, however, this unique arrangement can
deliver several benefits, some unexpected. Indeed, the Bui Dam
contract promotes agriculture while bypassing some of the obstacles
posed by the global trading system.46 One such obstacle is the
subsidies by European and North American nations.47
Agricultural sectors in Africa have been ravaged by these trade
policies, which many in the African Union perceive to be unfair.48 The
2005World Trade Organization (“WTO”) case Brazil v. United States
(known as the Cotton Four case), illustrates the harmful impact of
subsidies.49 The dispute in the Cotton Four case arose when the United
States Congress passed the Farm Bill, which granted subsidies to U.S.
farmers.50 Those subsidies hurt the cotton producers in Benin, Burkina
(last visited Jan. 16, 2019).
42. Id.
43. Bui Dam Electricity Project, Ghana, supra note 23.
44. See Isaac Odoom, Dam in, Cocoa Out; Pipes in, Oil Out: China’s
Engagement in Ghana’s Energy Sector, 52 J. ASIAN&AFR. STUD. 598, 608 (2015).
45. See id. at 603.
46. See id. at 609-10.
47. See Richard Mshomba, How Northern Subsidies Hurt Africa, AFR.
RENEWAL (Sept. 2002), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/september-
2002/how-northern-subsidies-hurt-africa (discussing the damage caused to African
countries by U.S. agricultural subsidies).
48. See TANDON, supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the popular viewpoint at the
African Union Trade Ministers meeting that Africa must reduce global trade in favor
of intra-African trade).
49. See generally Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/AB/R (adopted Mar. 3, 2005). See Panel Report,
United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 2.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/R
(adopted Sept. 8, 2004).
50. See Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note
49, ¶¶ 2.1, 7.2.
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Faso, Chad, andMali.51 In those four African nations, the cotton sector
is the second-largest formal employer after the national
governments.52 In these nations, approximately 900,000 farm units
provide employment to between seven and eight million actively
farming adults, who in turn support the livelihoods of the ten to
thirteen million people (including children and non-farming adults)
that comprise those farming units.53
I cannot overemphasize the significance of agriculture for African
economies. Agriculture is, alongside industry and services, one of the
most important developmental issues in the WTO. Since 1995,
agriculture has been on the WTO’s agenda.54
The Bui Dam scenario has the potential to revive Africa’s exports
of certain agricultural products and overcome trade barriers set by
subsidies from other nations. African states can achieve these
outcomes by exchanging agricultural exports for project finance or
other types of international investments.
IV. THE BACKSTORY
It seems difficult to categorize the Bui Dam transaction. Most of
those who have attempted to do so have described the transaction as
traditional project finance,55 while a few scholars regard it as a R4I
51. See Further Third Party Submission of Benin & Third Party Submission of
Chad, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Annex E-4, ¶ 33, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/R/Add.1 (Oct. 3, 2003) (explaining the participation of Benin and Chad
in a WTO dispute in response to the threat posed by US subsidies on upland cotton).
See generally Third Party Submission of Benin,United States—Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, Annex B-5, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/R/Add.1 (July 15, 2003) (discussing the
magnitude of U.S. cotton subsidies and Benin’s inability to compete with them).
52. David Boansi et al., Cotton Lint Export Trade in the Midst of Distortion:
What are the Competitiveness Statuses of Major Players in the Industry? Case of 12
Selected Countries, 4 BRIT. J. ECON. MGMT. & TRADE 1785, 1786 (2014).
53. Id.
54. See generally Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S.
410.
55. See Frauke Urban et al., Chinese Overseas Hydropower Dams and Social
Sustainability: The Bui Dam in Ghana and the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia, 2 ASIA
& PAC. POL’Y STUD. 573, 577-78 (2015). See generally Oliver Hensengerth,
Interaction of Chinese Institutions with Host Governments in Dam Construction:
The Bui Dam in Ghana (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Discussion
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contract.56 Although I cannot affirm with absolute confidence that the
Bui Dam transaction is an instance of R4I dealing, I can definitively
say that it does not fit any traditional investment agreement.
Elsewhere, I have described the Bui Dam as a R4I deal.57While I still
characterize this deal as unique, I am less confident that it falls entirely
under the category of R4I deal for the reasons given in this Article.
Ghana is not new to R4I contracting.58 It has entered into three
major R4I contracts,59 and its economic engagement with China has
increased in recent years.60 Those R4I deals relate to the construction
of the Bui Dam complex in 2007, the construction of other major
infrastructure projects in 2011, and the exploitation of bauxite in
2017.61
After entering into the Bui Dam deal in 2007, Ghana struck a major
R4I deal with China in 2011.62 In the 2011 deal, a consortium of
Chinese firms committed to building a number of key infrastructure
projects in return for oil.63 Then, in 2017, Ghana signed a deal with
China under which Sinohydro agreed to carry out Ghanaian
government road projects in exchange for bauxite.64 Per the
agreement, China will receive refined bauxite worth two billion U.S.
Paper No. 3, 2011).
56. See, e.g., Peter Konijn, Chinese Resources-for-Infrastructure (R4I) Swaps:
An Escape from the Resource Curse? 10, 12 (S. Afr. Inst. Int’l Aff., Occasional
Paper No. 201, 2014).
57. See, e.g., Zongwe, Three Stories, supra note 6, at 53.
58. See, e.g., Konijn, supra note 56, at 10-12.
59. See Konijn, supra note 56, at 10-12; see also George Tubei, 10 Massive
Projects the Chinese are Funding in Africa – Including Railways and a Brand-New
City, BUS. INSIDER S. AFR. (Sept. 25, 2018, 9:14 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
co.za/here-are-150-million-rand-projects-in-africa-funded-by-china-2018-9.
60. See Odoom, supra note 44, at 598 (discussing recent developments in
China’s economic, political, and cultural engagement with Ghana).
61. See Konijn, supra note 56, at 10-12; see also Tubei, supra note 59.
62. Will Connors,China Extends Africa Push with Loans, Deal in Ghana, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052748703384204575509630629800258.
63. See id.
64. Kwasi Kpodo, Ghana Opposition Seeks IMF View on $2 Billion Chinese
Bauxite Deal, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-ghana-bauxite-china/ghana-opposition-seeks-imf-view-on-2-billion-chinese-
bauxite-deal-idUSKCN1L829W.
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dollars as payment for the roads.65
So, what is a R4I contract? Confusion surrounds the exact
description of this sort of commercial transaction. Most of the
confusion arises from the fact that the different descriptions put forth
by scholars fly in the face of the written text of R4I contracts.66 I define
a R4I contract as a contract which combines a mining or oil contract
and an infrastructure project in order to extract minerals or
hydrocarbons and to pay for major infrastructure projects with
revenues generated from those extractive activities.67 Typically,
Chinese state-owned firms invest in and build the infrastructure, and
extract minerals or hydrocarbons from the host country as payment for
building the infrastructure.68 The parties to R4I contracts lay down
three classes of essential terms: terms regarding the development of
natural resources; terms of the loan; and terms regarding the
development of infrastructure.69
I identified twenty R4I contracts (see table below). The total value
of these contracts is no less than thirty billion U.S. dollars.70
65. Id.
66. See Dunia Prince Zongwe, Seeing the Whole Elephant: A Comprehensive
Framework for Analyzing Resource-for-Infrastructure Contracts as Intended by the
Parties, 1 S. AFR. J. POL’Y & DEV. 38, 40 (2015) [hereinafter Zongwe, The Whole
Elephant] (discussing that R4I contracts are compared with traditional investment
contracts or the project financing of the infrastructure).
67. See Dunia Prince Zongwe, Natural Resources for National Reconstruction:
A New Generation of Investment Contracts 36 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. L., Working
Paper No. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Zongwe, Natural Resources for National
Reconstruction]; see also Zongwe, The Whole Elephant, supra note 66, at 39.
68. See Zongwe, Natural Resources for National Reconstruction, supra note 67,
at 1.
69. Zongwe, The Whole Elephant, supra note 66, at 42-43.
70. SeeHALLAND ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
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Table: List of R4I contracts in Africa71
# Investor Host
Country
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71. Zongwe, Natural Resources for National Reconstruction, supra note 67, at
11.
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Scholars have debated whether R4I agreements represent a
novelty.72 Although I recognized R4I contracts as new in the world of
international investments as early as 2009,73 other scholars at the time
claimed that R4I deals did not differ from traditional contracts.74
Vivien Foster and others claimed in a World Bank report published in
2009 that R4I contracts are “by no means novel or unique,” and
perpetuate a “long history of natural resource-based transactions in the
oil industry.”75 Deborah Bräutigam, for her part, traced the origins of
R4I contracts to Japanese engagements with India and China in the
72. Compare FOSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 55 (arguing that R4I contracts are
not novel because they have documented use in Angola early in the 20th century),
with DEBORAH BRÄUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN
AFRICA 46-49 (2009).
73. Dunia Prince Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure: The Contractual Form of
Economic Complementarities Between China and Africa, in THE CHINAMONITOR
7, 8-9 (July 2009) [hereinafter Zongwe, Economic Complementarities].
74. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 55.
75. Id.
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late 1950s and 1970s.76 Others such as David G. Landry repeated
Bräutigam’s historical argument.77
The descriptions of the above-mentioned scholars do not portray
R4I deals accurately because they do not rely on the actual wording
and provisions of the relevant contractual documents.78When Foster,
Bräutigam, and the like assert that R4I contracts are not new, none of
their claims refer to the texts of the previous contractual documents
they mention.79 In other words, their assertions lack the required
empirical basis.
Unsurprisingly, another World Bank study, this time published in
2014, contradicted Foster as well as Bräutigam when it claimed that
R4I contracts represent a “new form of financing infrastructure.”80
Moreover, the mainstream textbooks and references on international
trade and investment have not so far discussed R4I contracts, in either
their current form or the forms that some scholars allege that R4I deals
assumed in the 1950s and the 1970s.81
The novelty of R4I contracts does not only lie in their structure, but
also in the beneficial outcomes they engender. In most of the R4I
contracts identified in the table above, the deals brought in
inordinately large finance and, not unusually, the host country’s
largest investment in any single contract since the independence of
that host country.82 For example, with R4I contracts, Angola drew in
4.5 billion U.S. dollars83 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
76. SeeBRÄUTIGAM, supra note 72, at 46-48.
77. David G. Landry, The Risks and Rewards of Resource-for-Infrastructure
Deals: Lessons from the Congo’s Sicomines Agreement 6-7 (Johns Hopkins Univ.,
Working Paper No. 16, 2018).
78. See, e.g., Landry, supra note 77, at 6-7; FOSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 55;
BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 72, at 46-48.
79. See, e.g., Landry, supra note 77, at 6-7; FOSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 55;
BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 72, at 46-48.
80. SeeHALLAND ETAL., supra note 6, at 13 (stating that a new form of financing
infrastructure has been created in countries that are wealthy in natural resources).
81. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 5 (discussing China’s modern
engagement with Africa starting in the 1950s at the Bandung Conference); see also
BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 72, at 46-47 (explaining that in the 1970s China was
primarily an agrarian economy).
82. Zongwe, Natural Resources for National Reconstruction, supra note 67, at
38.
83. The initial amount was two billion U.S. dollars. Subsequently, China
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(DRC) six billion U.S. dollars.84 Similarly, at the time the parties
signed the deal, the Bui Dam project accounted for the largest capital
inflows into Ghana since the country’s independence.85
Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile has stated that, despite “the rhetoric of
mutual benefit” and win-win outcomes through the South-South
cooperation discourse, South-South bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) do not offer a different legal framework.86 However, Ofodile
reached that conclusion because she focused on BITs, a traditional
investment tool.87 Most scholars focus on BITs because they regard
them as the main way of protecting FDIs.88 They apply their minds
attentively to BITs even after Jason Webb Yackee showed that
investment contracts between foreign investors and host states occur
because host states have for a long time managed to credibly commit
to treat investors fairly through international contracts.89 In particular,
Ofodile has not referred to R4I contracts, nor has she identified them
as distinct in the first place.90 Yet R4I contracts better represent the
Eximbank added 2.5 billion U.S. dollars in two payments, bringing the total to 4.5
billion U.S. dollars. Id. at 11.
84. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, the government in the
DRC renegotiated the R4I contract and put on hold three billion of the initial nine
billion U.S. dollars. This renegotiation brought the value of the investment down to
six billion U.S. dollars. Id.
85. See Zongwe, Three Stories, supra note 6, at 52.
86. Ofodile, supra note 4, at 197 (using the term South-South to refer to
cooperation between countries from the southern hemisphere); see alsoGathii, supra
note 2, at 695 (arguing that the BITs China has signed with African countries are no
different from the BITs African countries signed with Western countries).
87. Ofodile, supra note 4, at 138.
88. See, e.g., Won Kidane & Weidong Zhu, China-Africa Investment Treaties:
Old Rules, New Challenges, 37 FORDHAM INT’LL.J. 1035, 1037 (2014) (stating that
international investment agreements, particularly BITs, have become the principal
means of protecting foreign investments).
89. See Jason W. Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to
Contract in International Investment Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 121, 129 (2008) [hereinafter Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs?]; Jason W.
Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of
(International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 805, 809 (2008); Jason W. Yackee, Are BITs a Bright Idea? Exploring the
Ideational Basis of Investment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 195, 221 (2005) [hereinafter Yackee, Are BITs a Bright Idea?].
90. See Ofodile, supra note 4, at 140-43.
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South-South philosophy that Chinese leaders and firms proclaim.91
Additionally, China interacts with countries on the African continent
by means other than BITs, such as forum and dialogue platforms,
summits, frequent high-level official visits, and China’s oft-cited non-
interference policy.92
Although the large loans that R4I contracts carry with them fan
uneasiness about whether the host states can reasonably sustain the
cost,93 so far the contracts have not burdened host states with crippling
debts.94 In the case of the Bui Dam project, the Ghanaian Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning carried out a cost-revenue projection
to ensure that the project would not entail unsustainable debts.95
In addition, R4I contracts enable foreign investors to navigate and
survive the adverse political economies of some resource-rich
countries, including Venezuela and Angola.96 Accountability and
capacity challenges characterize those political and business
environments, known as the “resource curse,” which heightens a
number of risks for the capital invested in the host country.97 Such
risks to capital include uncertain or unstable legal frameworks,
changes in industry patterns, onerous contracts, heavy regulation of
the economy, ideological hostility, and nationalism.98
R4I contracts thus assist states that often lack the capacity to build
91. Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 128.
92. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: AFRICA AND THE NEW FORMS OF
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, at 24, UN Sales No. E.10.II.D.13 (2010).
93. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at xviii; see also Konijn, supra note 56, at
16 (noting that many countries were still recovering from the 1980s and 1990s debt
crisis).
94. HALLAND ET AL., supra note 6, at 27 (noting that revenues only have to cover
operation and maintenance expenses).
95. Hensengerth, supra note 55, at 40.
96. William Laraque, The US Asia-Pacific Pivot, China and The Philippines,
FIN. MAGNATES (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.financemagnates.com/institutional-
forex/bloggers/institutional-forexbloggersthe-us-asia-pacific-pivot-and-china/.
97. John Hammond, The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola and
Venezuela, 75 SCI. & SOC’Y 348, 348 (2011).
98. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
89-90 (2017); see also PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING
FOREIGN INVESTMENTUNDER INTERNATIONALLAW: LEGALASPECTS OF POLITICAL
RISK 19 (1997).
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on their own complex and large-scale infrastructure such as
hydroelectric dams, national railways, or airports.99 They also allow
those construction projects to be completed despite institutionalized
levels of corruption.100 However, Peter Konijn argues that R4I
contracts do not exacerbate or resolve the resource curse and that the
developmental impact of R4I contracts depends on the ability and
willingness of the host-government’s institutions to harness the
benefits and mitigate the risks of R4I contracts.101
However, Konijn did not consider that, compared to traditional
investments, R4I contracts have attracted far more finance.102 R4I
contracts yield results in spite of adverse political and business
environments by channeling the financing of infrastructure projects
directly to the contractor, bypassing the bureaucracy of the host state,
and thereby decreasing the risk that infrastructure money will be
embezzled.103 This contractual mechanism is not a panacea for the
resource curse, but it shows one way in which R4I contracts have
enjoyed relative success in resource-rich and resource-cursed nations.
In that sense, R4I contracts prove to be very pragmatic.
So far, this Article has demonstrated that R4I contracts differ from
traditional investment contracts and offer unique advantages.104 Still,
to what degree does the Bui Dam deal resemble R4I contracts? The
Bui Dam deal defies classification. One side of the deal— the
infrastructure side—looks like classic project finance; the other side—
the export of cocoa by Ghanaian farmers— seems to fall into the
category of international trade agreements.105 At the same time, the
loan component of the deal looks like traditional trade finance.106 In
the end, is the Bui Dam deal the intersection of investment (i.e., project
finance), trade, and finance? Or is the deal greater than the mere sum
99. See Konijn, supra note 56, at 5.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 25-26.
102. Id. at 16.
103. Zongwe, Three Stories, supra note 6, at 55.
104. See Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 17.
105. Id. at 272-73, 307 (“The Ghana Marketing Board, a state-owned institution,
will export cocoa products to China to pay for the construction of the Bui Dam.”).
106. See What is Trade Finance?, TRADE FIN., https://tradefinanceanalytics.com/
what-is-trade-finance (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (explaining that trade finance helps
mitigate risks).
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of its parts? And, if R4I contracting departs from traditional
investment agreements, is the Bui Dam therefore a unique version of
a unique generation of international commercial contracts? For the
time being, I can draw out the differences between R4I contracts and
the Bui Dam scenario, leaving the question as to the definite
classification of the Bui Dam deal for later.
The infrastructure built through an R4I scenario counts as perhaps
the most obvious advantage of a Bui Dam sort of deal. Through the
Bui Dam project, the hydroelectric dam that the Ghanaian government
sought for so long became reality.107 Gathii denies that, if a country
needs infrastructure, merely investing in that sorely needed
infrastructure is necessarily good.108 He believes that such a view sets
“an extremely low baseline to establish whether China’s presence in
Africa has a positive impact.”109 Yet the economic analysis of law
contradicts Gathii because it takes the position that the proper ideal of
the legal system is to maximize the satisfaction of individuals’
preferences.110 Thus, any law, agreement, or deal that satisfies the
preferences, the ‘utility,’ or the ‘needs’ of individuals or specific
governments111 is ‘good’ in an economic sense, regardless of whether
those needs relate to infrastructure, agricultural products, or minerals.
That “extremely low baseline” actually determines whether a lawyer
or an economist considers a deal more or less efficient.112
The Bui Dam agreement outperforms R4I contracts in its
distributive design. First, different actors come into the picture. Often,
R4I contracts involve a consortium of Chinese state-owned firms and
107. See Bui Dam Electricity Project, Ghana, supra note 23.
108. SeeGathii, supra note 2, at 666 (highlighting that China’s presence in Africa
does not necessarily mean it has a positive effect).
109. Id. at 666-67.
110. See NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS: ENHANCINGNORMATIVE ANALYSIS 21 (2005) (stating in chapter
two of the book that the economic analysis of the law posits that “the proper ideal of
the legal system is the promotion of social welfare, that is, the maximization of the
satisfaction of individuals’ preferences”).
111. Here, I assume that the person in question wants what he needs. Just like the
Ghanaian government wanted the hydroelectric dam that it also needed. Indeed,
satisfying what a person needs, but that he does not want, does not amount to
satisfying that person’s preferences.
112. Thuo Gathii, supra note 2, at 666-67.
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a host state or a firm owned by the host state.113 By contrast, the Bui
Dam project involved a major Chinese state-owned firm, Sinohydro,
and cocoa farmers—a transaction mediated by the Ghana Marketing
Board.114 The involvement of cocoa farmers meant that the Bui deal
not only benefited Ghana by generating employment and taxes, it also
boosted demand for the work of cocoa farmers considerably.115 The
ripple effects do not stop there as farmers tend to support entire
families.116
Indeed, the economic and distributive impacts of R4I contracts are
broader thanks to agriculture. Though the importance of agriculture
has decreased for several developing countries over the years, the
sector remains a critical core of developing economies.117 In
developing countries, about sixty percent of people live in rural areas,
and two-thirds of those people live in extreme poverty and engage in
subsistence farming.118
Second, the Bui Dam scenario is twice more labor-intensive than
R4I contracts. This outcome flows from the observation that the
infrastructure development creates employment and, at the same time,
the agricultural exports create even more employment than the
infrastructural side.119 As indicated above, the Bui Dam construction
project created thousands of jobs.120 The dramatic increase in the
demand for agricultural exports generated more jobs and more work
113. See, e.g., Convention de Collaboration entre La Republique Democratique
du Congo et la Societe Sinohydro Corporation Relative Au Developpement D’un
Projet Minier et D’un Projet. D’infrastructures en Republique Democratique Du
Congo, China-Dem. Rep. Congo, art. 3.1, Janvier 2008, http://congomines.org/
system/attachments/assets/000/000/276/original/B5bis-Sicomines-Convention-
Incl-Anx-2008-Consortium-Entreprises-Chinoises-RDC.pdf?1430928308
[hereinafter DRC Framework Agreement].
114. Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 272-73.
115. See id.
116. See Boansi et al., supra note 52, at 1786.
117. See Evan Pennisi, Agriculture Creates an Economic Future for Developing
Countries, GLOBALEDGE (Dec. 12, 2012, 10:40 AM), https://globaledge.msu.edu/
blog/post/1400/agriculture-creates-an-economic-future-f.
118. MICHAEL P. TODARO&STEPHENC. SMITH, ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT 437-
38 (2015).
119. See Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 359-60.
120. Kwadjo Oto, Bui City Project to Create About 4000 Jobs, GHANAWEB (Sept.
6, 2007), https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Bui-City-
Project-To-Create-About-4000-Jobs-130130.
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for cocoa farmers. Last but not least, unlike R4I contract types,
scenarios like the Bui Dam can last indefinitely because the resource
involved (i.e., an agricultural product) is renewable, unlike minerals
and hydrocarbons.
V. COMPLICATIONS
Despite its many benefits, the Bui Dam project was not smooth
sailing, and a host of problems emerged which indicate that the Bui
Dam model is not flawless.121 The Bui Dam exemplifies how this type
of infrastructure can hurt development.122 The social implications of
large-scale infrastructure projects have been known to include:
resettlement of individuals and local communities; psychological
stress; loss or declines of livelihood; changes to lifestyles and
traditions; negative effects on fishing and agricultural activities; and
restrictions on access to quality of water and land, as well as other
types of environmental damage.123
The first major issue that arose from the Bui Dam projects
concerned the number of local workers hired to work on the
construction of the Dam.124 After construction on the Dam began,
authors emerged with exaggerated claims about China’s hiring its own
people to work on the Bui Dam project.125 In one instance, and without
independently verifying the claims, author Howard French quoted a
Ghanaian who stated that the Chinese had employed 600 of their own
workers to build the dam and “only hired a few [Ghanaian workers],
and it is only to do unskilled labor.”126 If French had bothered to verify
those claims he would have realized, as Giles Mohan and May Tan-
Mullins’ empirical research later showed, that 3,000 Ghanaian
workers were hired to do the project.127 As Mohan and Tan-Mullins’
121. Bui Dam in the Black Volta River, Ghana, ENVTL. JUSTICE ATLAS,
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/bui-dam-ghana (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
122. See Bui Dam, Ghana, INT’L RIVERS, https://www.internationalrivers.org/
resources/bui-dam-ghana-3608 (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (noting that thousands
were relocated and lost critical possessions and land).
123. Urban et al., supra note 55, at 573.
124. See HOWARD FRENCH, CHINA’S SECOND CONTINENT: HOW A MILLION
MIGRANTSAREBUILDING ANEW EMPIRE INAFRICA 167-168 (2014).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 199.
127. Giles Mohan & May Tan-Mullins, Chinese Migrants in Africa as New
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revealed, local workers by far outnumbered Chinese migrants.128
Furthermore, the claims that French uncritically quoted do not take
into account the fact that the Bui Dam project created considerable
demand for the cocoa sold by countless Ghanaian farmers.129
Second, the Ghanaian authorities did not disclose most of the details
regarding the deal. Specifically, they did not publish the Bui Dam deal
in its entirety.130 In fact, high-ranking stakeholders from both Ghana
and China refused to release critical documents such as turnkey
contracts.131 Nonetheless, Ghanaian authorities divulged some
information about the deal. Notably, they set up the official website of
the Bui Dam,132 which provided—and still provides—information
about how Ghana, together with their Chinese partners, built the
hydroelectric complex. That said, the majority of what is known about
the project comes from secondary sources.133
It was the resettlement and displacement of people living in the
vicinity of the Bui Dam that most significantly tainted this
construction project.134 The resettlement was particularly disturbing,
the Ghanaian authorities relocated local populations to areas that have
far less fisheries resources.135 The Ghanaian authorities had to relocate
Agents of Development? An Analytical Framework, 21 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 588, 595
(2009).
128. Id.
129. See Paul W.J. Yankson et al., The Livelihood Challenges of Resettled
Communities of the Bui Dam Project in Ghana and the Role of Chinese Dam-
Builders 36 DEV. POL’YREV. 476, 481-86 (2017).
130. See Konijn, supra note 56, at 14.
131. See id.; James Habia, The Bui Dam Impact on Ghana-China Relations:
Transparency, Accountability and Development Outcomes from China’s Sino
Hydro Dam Project in Ghana 22 (Sept. 24, 2009) (unpublished Master’s thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Library system).
132. Welcome to Bui Power Authority, BUI POWER AUTH.,
https://www.buipower.com/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
133. See, e.g., Urban et al., supra note 55, at 578; Hensengerth, supra note 55;
Bui Dam, Ghana, supra note 122; Bui Dam Electricity Project, Ghana, supra note
23; China Signs Financing for Ghana’s 400-MW Bui, HYDROWORLD (Sept. 8,
2008), https://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2008/09/china-signs-financing-for-
ghanas-400-mw-bui.html.
134. Hensengerth, supra note 55, at 30-31.
135. Id. at 31.
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at least eight villages136 and 1,216 individuals.137 They resettled some
fishing communities miles away from fishing areas.138 Other
communities complained that their new lands were not as good for
farming.139 Still other communities faced the danger of
schistosomiasis diseases brought on by the new dam.140 In the end,
many of the resettled people lost their livelihoods.141
Chinese firms did not take part in the resettlement of the affected
communities, nor did they engage in planning the Bui Dam.142 The
Ghanaian government directed both the planning and the
resettlement.143 Nonetheless, the social and environmental
consequences involved in building the hydroelectric dam remain a
liability for the entire project.144 The Ghanaian government can
certainly praise itself for having done much better during the
resettlement necessary to make way for the Bui Dam than it did during
the resettlement occasioned by the construction of the Akosombo
Dam.145 All the same, the construction of the Bui Dam imposed heavy
costs on surrounding local communities.146
Related to the issue of resettlement and displacement is the issue of
environmental degradation. Environmental activists protested against
the Bui Dam project.147 Even with an environmental impact
136. Id. at 25 (indicating that eight villages had to be relocated and that, by June
2010, the Ghanaian government had already relocated four villages).
137. See id.; see also Bui Dam, Ghana, supra note 122 (claiming that the
Ghanaian authorities had to relocate as many as 2,600 people).




142. Hensengerth, supra note 55, at 43; see also FRENCH, supra note 124, at 199
(reporting that, although they were not directly involved in the resettlement of
affected communities, the Chinese contractors built the new replacement villages,
which consisted of “simple and functional complexes”).
143. Id.
144. See Hensengerth, supra note 55, at 43-44.
145. FRENCH, supra note 124, at 199 (quoting a local chief who said that, in order
to build the Akosombo Dam, people were resettled in bad conditions, for instance,
some people were relocated close to the turbines and people were generally given
less land).
146. See, e.g., Hensengerth, supra note 55, at 30-31 (discussing the “bleak
picture” and the harsh realities of resettling many local communities).
147. Bui Dam Electricity Project, Ghana, supra note 23.
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assessment and a feasibility study following the signature of Ghana’s
deal with China,148 the project consisted in diverting the Black Volta
River, a project that was completed in December 2008.149 The Bui
Dam required the flooding of 444 square kilometers of land,150
degrading that area in the process. More disturbing, the flooded area
included a national park, an environmentally protected area.151 More
specifically, the project inundated about twenty-one percent of the
700-square-mile Bui National Park.152
Another concern relates to the effectiveness of domestic state-
owned corporations. The foreign investor involved in the Bui project
was Sinohydro, a state-owned Chinese firm.153 However, the deal
raises question about the effectiveness of the Ghanaian state-owned
corporations. This question should concern policy makers because of
its implications for long-term development. Indeed, if domestic firms
had the capacity to build the hydroelectric complex in the first place,
Ghana would not have needed state-owned firms from China or any
other foreign nations to participate in the project. Ideally, host
countries should aim to build this sort of large-scale infrastructure on
their own, hiring local firms and using local expertise.
It is a signature feature of China’s investments in Africa that those
investments involve state-to-state business models.154 The relative
success of the state-to-state model in Africa suggests that state-to-state
dealings better promote and protect FDIs than BITs.155 Furthermore,




151. Bui Dam, Ghana, supra note 122.
152. Urban et al., supra note 55, at 578; Bui Dam, Ghana, supra note 122.
153. Bui Dam, Ghana, supra note 122.
154. See CHRISALDEN ET AL., CHINARETURNS TOAFRICA: ARISING POWER AND
ACONTINENTEMBRACE 7, 16 (2008); see also Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra
note 12, at 131-32.
155. See Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 107-08 (arguing that,
while traditional wisdom thought of BITs as promoting foreign investment, this was
unsupported by evidence and the state-to-state model has empirically shown a
dramatic increase in foreign investment in Africa through China’s FDI and R4I
contracts); see also Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs?, supra note 89, at 121-23
(recommending that policy makers forgo bilateral investment treaties in favor of an
investment regime based on contracts).
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contracts do not serve neoliberal agendas.156
Yet in contrast to how they appear at first glance, the state-to-state
arrangements behind the Bui Dam deal and R4I contracts do not
necessarily entail strengthening host states.157 A closer look at the Bui
Dam project shows that Ghanaian state institutions almost exclusively
participated in planning and securing the necessary permits and
licenses.158Meanwhile, Chinese contractors did most of the financing
and entirely built the dam.159 Therefore, the project did not so much
strengthen the role of the host state in development as much as it
displaced it.160 Policy makers must therefore make sure that
arrangements like the Bui Dam scenario do not weaken the host state
and its ability to design and drive development. Though funding may
come from a foreign state or firm, development must be internally
driven.
Another complication relates to the valuation of the R4I contracts
and the Bui Dam deal. Valuing those contracts is very difficult and
prone to errors. Landry evaluates the R4I contract between China and
the DRC using the net present value (NPV) method.161 This attempt to
value a R4I contract raises a number of issues. First of all, Landry uses
the NPV method to explain whether the R4I contract is a good
investment from the Chinese perspective, whereas the contract
expressly uses the internal rate of return (IRR) method.162
156. Cf. Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 107-08 (discussing how
state involvement is useful to both Chinese investors and traditional project finance
structures).
157. See generally Hensengerth, supra note 55, at 9-14 (discussing the planning
of the Bui Dam, including various stages of state-to-state engagement between
China and Ghana).
158. See id. at 14-17.
159. See id. at 34-35.
160. See id. (illustrating China’s role as financier, contractor, and constructor of
the Dam). I am grateful to Michelle Egan for making that observation after my
presentation at the SIEL Biennal Conference at American University Washington
College of Law on July 14, 2018.
161. Landry, supra note 77, at 5, 7 (explaining that the NPV method calculates
the difference between the present value—the current monetary worth of cash flows
using a discount rate—of its present and future inflows and outflows of cash).
162. DRC Framework Agreement, supra note 113, art. 13(3)(3) (providing that
the DRC must ensure that the conditions of its collaboration with the consortium of
Chinese firms yield an IRR of nineteen percent). See id. at 10.
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Moreover, even if the NPVmethod proved the better way of valuing
the R4I contract, the method grossly understates the ‘strategic value’
of the contract for the Chinese.163 It wrongly assumes that China or the
Chinese state-owned firm engage in those deals only to make a profit.
This assumption is mistaken because, on several occasions, Chinese
investments have adopted much longer-term perspectives.164 Third,
the NPV was based on economic conditions as they existed in 2016—
a period characterized by depressed commodity prices.165 The question
is whether conditions in 2016 accurately reflect economic conditions
throughout the life of the R4I contract.
Although Landry used that method to evaluate the R4I contract
between China and the DRC, that exercise illustrates the difficulties
involved in trying to value the Bui Dam deal as well.166
VI. UPSHOT OF WHAT IS PROVEN
I must establish the basic premises of my argument if I want to
substantiate the conclusion I reached in this Article. This task requires
rehashing some principles that are already well established in the field,
namely absolute advantage and comparative advantage. These
principles originate in classical economics.167
Most scholars credit Adam Smith with formulating the principle of
absolute advantage.168 The idea behind absolute advantage assumes
that a nation will produce and export goods that it can produce more
cheaply than other countries, thanks to its labor costs, its weather,
163. See Landry, supra note 77, at 4, 7 (describing the economic benefits China
has received from R4I contracts as it has risen in prominence as a provider of
development finance).
164. SeeWu Yabin & Bai Xiao, China’s Infrastructure Development Strategy in
Africa: Mutual Gain?, BRIDGES AFR., Mar. 2017, at 16 (describing the social
benefits of Chinese infrastructure investments in Africa as mutually beneficial in
terms of technology transfer, capacity building, improvement of living standards,
and friendly international relations).
165. Landry, supra note 77, at 20.
166. See generally id. at 5, 18, 24.
167. See, e.g., Hollis B. Chenery, Comparative Advantage and Development
Policy, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 18-51 (1961).
168. Robert A. Blecker, The ‘Unnatural and Retrograde Order’: Adam Smith’s
Theories of Trade and Development Reconsidered, 64 ECONOMICA 527, 527-28
(1997).
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natural resources endowment, and other factors.169 The absolute
advantage therefore depends on lower production costs.170
By contrast, David Ricardo maintained that, even if a country could
produce and export goods A, B, C more cheaply than other countries,
it would still make sense for that country to specialize in one of the
three goods.171 This counter-intuitive answer to the question of which
goods to produce is referred to as comparative advantage.172 Unlike
absolute advantage, comparative advantage relies on lower
opportunity costs, as opposed to lower production costs.173
The flip side of comparative advantage is that nations should trade
the goods that they can produce efficiently (i.e., with lower
opportunity costs) for the goods that they produce less efficiently.174
The principle of comparative advantage still forms the basis, or the
“engine,” of international trade.175 The theory also explains why China
would import certain agricultural goods from certain African
countries. Most importantly, it provides the economic rationale for
R4I contracts or other international contracts of the Bui Dam type.176
169. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTHOFNATIONS 182-97 (Thomas Cadell &William Strahan eds., 9th ed. 1799)
(arguing that it is more advantageous to import a foreign product, rather than to
produce the product domestically, when the foreign country has superior resources
and a greater capacity to produce it).
170. See id.
171. See generallyDAVIDRICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICALECONOMY
AND TAXATION 12-17 (Everyman Library ed., J.M. Dent 1911) (1817) (discussing
the exchangeable value of labor costs and critiquing Smith’s theories of labor
valuation); see Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative
Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 50-53 (1998)
(illustrating the theory of comparative and absolute advantage in a numerical
hypothetical).
172. See Sykes, supra note 171, at 49-53 (predicting that nations will specialize
in the production of goods in which they have comparative advantage and export
those goods to other countries in exchange for goods in which they lack comparative
advantage).
173. Id. at 52 (illustrating opportunity costs using a hypothetical).
174. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical
Reflections on Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LARAZA L.J. 65, 71 (2006).
175. Sykes, supra note 171, at 49, 52; see also Gonzalez, supra note 174, at 71-
72 (describing how comparative advantage legitimizes and allows free trade).
176. SeeXiao Ye, Africa-China: A Path to Mutual Prosperity?, MAKING ITMAG.
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.makingitmagazine.net/?p=3050 (highlighting China
and sub-Saharan Africa’s advantageous trade relationship as it relates to Africa’s
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In other words, by importing products such as cocoa from countries
such as Ghana, China imports what it cannot produce more efficiently
than cocoa farmers in Ghana. Yet I still have to establish that China
cannot produce those agricultural goods efficiently.
The appetite of China’s growing population of 1.4 billion people
has made it difficult for the country to achieve agricultural self-
sufficiency.177 A 2017 Bloomberg report claims that China simply
cannot produce enough food for its people.178
This situation is not unique to China. Africa itself, Asia, and South
America will add at least another two billion mouths to feed in the next
generation.179 This does not necessarily mean that food shortages will
worsen in the future. Nor does it foretell any doomsday famine
scenarios like the one presented in the 18th century by Thomas
Malthus,180 which predicted that the earth’s resources, including
agricultural resources, will not be able to feed the ballooning global
population. Today, technology can help the world’s resources keep up
with its growing population.181 Instead, this situation suggests that the
current and future demographic and economic structure of demands
for food sustains – and will sustain – the Bui Dammodel. Competition
from food-importing nations in the global South will further sustain
the model.
Four decades ago, China embarked on a major agricultural
reform.182 This reform—which evolved over the years—consisted of
four parts: imposing market controls; improving farm efficiency;
curbing land loss; and increasing imports.183 As part of this effort,
comparative advantage in labor intensive agricultural exports).
177. Farming the World: China’s Epic Race to Avoid a Food Crisis, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (May 22, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-feeding-china/.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 4-5
(Elec. Scholarly Publ’g Project ed., 1998) (1798) (arguing that while the ability of a
person to cover their needs with their income increased “incrementally,” population
—if unchecked—could increase geometrically.)
181. Edward A. Ackerman, Population, Natural Resources, and Technology, 369
ANNALSAM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 84, 94, 97 (1967).
182. Farming the World: China’s Epic Race to Avoid a Food Crisis, supra note
177.
183. See id.
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China has been increasing its imports and buying overseas agricultural
products such as beef and soybeans.184
This has led to the so-called “land grabs” in countries like
Mozambique.185 However, most of the hype about land grabs is not
borne out by the facts on the ground. As Brautigam pointed out, none
of those headlines about China’s grabbing lands in Africa proved
true.186 Rather than supplying its own supermarkets back home,
China’s land projects in Africa appear to aim mostly at boosting food
production in poor countries, thereby increasing China’s global
influence.187 While this motivation can also drive the Bui Dam-like
contractual arrangements, it is much less sustainable than food imports
driven by the importer’s needs to feed its large population. Indeed,
China could in the near future decide to prioritize goals other than
seeking to build political capital overseas. However, potential demand
from large nations such as India could compensate for the lower
demand resulting from such policy changes.188
While it may not have yet reached agricultural self-sufficiency,
China has the capacity to build infrastructure not only at home, but
also abroad.189 Infrastructure refers to the all the basic inputs needed
for the economy to function properly.190 Infrastructure is significant as
it constitutes a key component of trade logistics.191
184. Id.
185. John Vidal, Oxfam Warns of Spiraling Land Grab in Developing Countries,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2011, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2011/sep/22/oxfam-land-grab-developing-countries.
186. DEBORAHBRAUTIGAM, WILLAFRICA FEED CHINA? 12-13 (2015).
187. Farming the World: China’s Epic Race to Avoid a Food Crisis, supra note
177. This apparent goal corresponds to China’s Africa Policy, whose most important
principle is ‘co-development.’ See Li Ashan, China’s New Policy Toward Africa, in
CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID AND INFLUENCE 21, 32 (Robert I. Rotberg ed.,
2008).
188. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at xviii (stating that other nations such as
India have also emerged as major financiers for African infrastructure development).
189. See Ruth Gordon, The Environmental Implications of China’s Engagement
with Sub-Saharan Africa, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109, 11113
(2012) (describing how China has sent contractors to develop both physical and soft
infrastructure in Africa in exchange for securing a flow of natural resources to
China).
190. Afeikhena Jerome, Infrastructure in Africa: The Record 2 (Afr. Dev. Bank,
Economic Research Paper No. 46, 1999).
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Lack of finance represents the greatest obstacle to infrastructure
development on the African continent. Infrastructure projects are
capital-intensive, and African states have not yet managed to attract
enough project finance.192 Out of the fifty-one projects identified by
the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), only
four have reached an advanced stage of implementation.193
The World Bank estimates that, in 2010, African states spent forty-
five billion U.S. dollars a year on infrastructure, but needed ninety-
three billion U.S. dollars a year—a funding gap of thirty-one billion
dollars.194 By 2018, that funding gap rose to at least 130 billion U.S.
dollars a year.195 Most states in Africa suffer from massive
infrastructure deficits and very weak infrastructural bases, though
huge variations exist among countries on the continent.196 To be sure,
nine out of the ten countries with the world’s lowest quality of
infrastructure related to trade and transport (for instance, ports,
railroads, roads, and information technology) come from Africa.197
What perhaps best symbolizes China’s leading role in developing
infrastructure in Africa is the construction of the 200 million U.S.
dollars headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.198
The One Belt, One Road initiative illustrates China’s ability to export
international (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
192. See AFRICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A TIME FOR TRANSFORMATION 1 (Vivien
Foster & Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia eds., 2010).
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194. See Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 192, at 1, 8.
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196. See also Rabah Arezki & Amadou Sy, Financing Africa’s Infrastructure
Deficit: From Development Banking to Long-Term Investing 6 (Brookings Inst.,
Global Views Paper No. 2, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/financing-
africas-infrastructure-deficit-from-development-banking-to-long-term-investing/;
see Global Rankings 2018: Logistics Performance Index, WORLD BANK,
https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global?sort=asc&order=Infrastructure# (last
visited Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Global Rankings 2018].
197. See Global Rankings 2018, supra note 196 (reporting that, out of 160
countries, the ten countries with the lowest quality of infrastructure related to trade
and transport were, in descending order of quality, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
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its capacity to spur infrastructure development in Africa.199 The
Middle Kingdom extended this initiative across the African
continent.200 As part of that initiative, China paid eighty percent of the
$11.17 billion dollars cost of building the Nairobi-Mombasa railway
line in Kenya, completed in mid-2017.201
Thus, while China has a shortage of certain agricultural products, it
has great and exportable capacity to build various kinds of
infrastructure. By contrast, Africa has enormous agricultural potential,
but huge deficits and a low base in infrastructure. This situation gives
rise to the complementarities that made the Bui Dam deal between
Ghana and China possible.202
To recap, African nations can increase infrastructure investments in
Africa through R4I contracts. As a matter of fact, nations that have
entered into large-scale R4I contracts have managed to attract the
greatest amount of investment that the countries had seen since their
respective independence.203
The downside of R4I contracts and most capital flows to Africa is
that the capital flocks to countries rich in minerals and hydrocarbons,
such as Nigeria, Angola, and Mozambique, while ignoring the many
countries on the continent that are not so well blessed.204
In recent years, African states have increased investments in
infrastructure, though the funding gap between the infrastructure
investments needed and the infrastructure finance actually received
remains huge.205 Still, China has recently emerged as Africa’s largest
199. See James McCully, Note, Does “One Belt, One Road” Mean “One
Country, One System?” An Analysis of Hong Kong’s Vanishing Autonomy Through
an “One Belt, One Road” Influence Educational Scholarship, 44 SYRACUSE J. INT’L
L. & COM. 397, 400 (2017).
200. Ballard, supra note 7.
201. Id.
202. See also Zongwe, Economic Complementarities, supra note 73, at 7 (making
a similar argument, but more generally about R4I contracts, and not specifically
focusing or discussing the Bui Dam deal); Dunia P. Zongwe, The Competitive Edges
of China’s Resource-for-Infrastructure Investment Contracts in Africa, 2 PEKINGU.
J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 227 (2010).
203. See Zongwe, Natural Resources for National Reconstruction, supra note 67,
at 38 (discussing the occurrence in Angola, the DRC, and Ghana).
204. Id. at 1, 7-8.
205. E.g., Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, supra note 192, at 1 (placing the gap at
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infrastructure financier.206 China has evinced its interest in channeling
some of the finance it sends to Africa through R4I contracts.207 R4I
contracts thus prove a tool to attract investments into the infrastructure
sectors, where investment is usually not as large as in the extractive
sectors.
The Bui Dam scenario shows that countries that do not have
minerals and hydrocarbons can nonetheless attract massive
infrastructure investments, as long as they have agricultural products
to export.208 The good news is that most African countries have
agricultural potential. The Cotton Four case makes it plain that the
continent heavily relies on agriculture and has the potential to use
agricultural exports to attract infrastructure investments.209 In addition,
scenarios like the Bui Dam project can enable African states to go
around the trade barriers in agricultural subsidies set by the richer
countries of the global North.210
In fact, R4I contracts will allow African states to kill two birds with
one deal: R4I contracts will allow them to attract massive investments
in infrastructure while at the same time allowing them to increase their
agricultural exports – something they cannot do under the existing
rules of the world trading system.
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A series of policies implications can be derived from the Bui Dam
project experience in Ghana. The Bui Dam scenario demonstrates that
developing nations can leverage growing demand from Asia to
develop their agricultural exports and infrastructure. A policy question
that arises is whether such a deal should be structured as an investment
contract or a trade agreement. Is the Bui Dam contract trade or
investment, or both? The answer to this question matters because it
ninety-three billion dollars a year).
206. FOSTER, ET AL., supra note 6, at xi.
207. See Zongwe, Natural Resources for National Reconstruction, supra note 67,
at 1 (describing China’s interest in Africa’s natural resources).
208. SeeHensengerth, supra note 55, at 38 (describing the use of cocoa in the Bui
Dam arrangement).
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determines which rules apply: trade or investment. If the latter, then
the relevant BIT will apply.211 The answer to that question also
determines where the parties to a dispute should refer their matter to:
for example, a regional trade dispute-resolution mechanism or the
WTO, on the one hand, or the International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on the other. The 2007 R4I contract
between China and the DRC expressly indicates that, if the parties fail
to resolve disputes amicably, the parties should refer their disputes to
ICSID;212 however, in the majority of cases, the parties have not
disclosed all the express terms that would put their contracts in one or
the other category.
Related to that question is the matter of whether the Bui Dam deal
is a type of R4I contract, or is it an altogether different type of
contract? While the Bui Dam arrangement shares several similarities
with R4I contracts, it differs from R4I contracts in a few crucial
respects: it does not involve minerals or hydrocarbons, or any joint
venture between the host state and a foreign investor.213
Either way, the contract reinforces the role of the state in
development. This feature leads to another policy question: does the
Bui Dam scenario reject neoliberal theories to embrace the
developmental state theory? This question is far-reaching as far as the
long-term prosperity of developing countries is concerned. In
particular, it may inform national policy makers as to the nature of
their development policies going forward. To avoid the risk of state
displacement, policy makers must strengthen domestic political
institutions and contractual arrangements to safeguard national
interests, such as the protection of the environment.214 Specifically, to
move away from reliance on Chinese finance and state-owned firms,
policy makers in Africa must vigorously pursue transfer of technology
and knowledge from their Chinese counterparts to African workers
211. See DRC Framework Agreement, supra note 113, art. 15(3) (obliging the
DRC to respect the BIT it entered into with China).
212. DRC Framework Agreement, supra note 113, art. 21.
213. See generally Zongwe, Natural Resources for National Reconstruction,
supra note 67, at 1, 18, 36 (describing generally R4I contracts).
214. SeeHensengerth, supra note 55, at 43-44 (stating “responsibility for ensuring
that provisions concerning environmental supervision are upheld ultimately rests
with the Ghanaian president and the Bui Power Authority”).
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and firms.215
Policy makers should also consider the Bui Dam model because it
allows host states to attract massive finance without burdening
themselves with very high or unsustainable debts.216 Stakeholders
have long worried those fast-flowing financial streams to the African
continent may drown states in unsustainable debt.217 Fortunately, so
far, the available evidence support the view that both R4I contracts
and the Bui Dam deal do not lead to such nightmare scenarios.218 I
attribute this fortunate outcome to the barter-like character of those
deals.
Perhaps the most important question regarding development policy
arises when considering the persistent debates and concerns about
whether African countries really stand to gain from this new type of
international business transaction and when considering my
recommendation that developing states adopt deals like the Bui Dam
more often and whenever possible. Indeed, the greatest challenge for
policy makers consists in finding a reliable way to measure the costs
and benefits of enacting a Bui Dam scenario.
215. Thuo Gathii, supra note 2, at 682-87, 690.
216. See generally Hensengerth, supra note 55, at 40 (stating that the Bui Dam
loan agreement “will not impact debt sustainability”).
217. E.g., Konijn, supra note 56, at 16.
218. SeeHensengerth, supra note 55, at 40 (projecting that the dam would pay for
itself once operational); Zongwe, Ore for Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 289.
